16.29.1. "We'd better hope that strong cypto, cheap telecoms and free markets can provide the organizing basis for a workable society because it is clear that coercion as an organizing principle ain't what it used to be." [Duncan Frissell, in his sig, 4-13-94] 16.29.2. "What is the "inevitability" argument?" - Often made by me (Tim May), Duncan Frissell, Sandy Sandfort, and Perry Metzger (with some twists). And Hal Finney takes issue with certain aspects and contributes incisive critiques. + Reasons: - borders becoming more transparent to data flow - encryption is not detectable/stoppable - derivative financial instruments, money sloshing across borders - transnationalism - cash machines, wire transfers - "permanent tourists" - Borders are becoming utterly transparent to massive data flows. The rapid export of crypto is but an ironic example of this. Mosaid, ftp, gopher, lynx...all cross borders fluidly and nearly untraceably. It is probably too late to stop these systems, short of "pulling the plug" on the Net, and this pulling the plug is simply too expensive to consider. (If the Feds ever really figure out the long- range implications of this stuff, they may try it...but probably not.) 16.29.3. "What is the "crypto phase change"?" - I'm normally skeptical of claims that a "singularity" is coming (nanotechnology being the usual place this is claimed, a la Vinge), but "phase changes" are more plausible. The effect of cheap printing was one such phase change, altering the connectivity of society and the dispersion of knowledge in a way that can best be described as a phase change. The effects of strong crypto, and the related ideas of digital cash, anonymous markets, etc., are likely to be similar. - transition - tipping factors, disgust by populace, runaway taxation + "leverage effect" - what Kelly called "the fax effect" - crypto use spreads, made more popular by common use - can nucleate in a small group...doesn't need mass acceptance 16.29.4. "Can crypto anarchy be stopped?" + A goal is to get crypto widely enough deployed that it cannot then be stopped - to the point of no return, where the cost of withdrawing or banning a technology is simply too high (not always a guaranteee) - The only recourse is a police state in which homes and businesses are randomly entered and searched, in which cryptography is outlawed and vigorously prosecuted, in which wiretaps, video surveillance, and other forms of surveillance are used aggressively, and in which perhaps the very possession of computers and modems is restricted. - Anything short of these police state tactics will allow the development of the ideas discussed here. To some extent. But enough to trigger the transition to a mostly crypto anarchic situation. - (This doesn't mean everyone, or even most, will use crypto anarchy.) 16.29.5. Need not be a universal or even popular trend - even if restricted to a minority, can be very influential - George Soros, Quantum fund, central banks, Spain, Britain, Germany - and a minority trend can affect others 16.29.6. "National borders are just speedbumps on the digital superhighway." 16.29.7. "Does crypto anarchy have to be a mass movement to succeed?" - Given that only a tiny fraction is now aware of the implications.... + Precedents for "vanguard" movements + high finance in general is an elite thing - Eurodollars, interest rate swaps, etc....not exactly Joe Average...and yet of incredible importance (George Soros has affected European central bank policy) - smuggling is in general not a mass thing - etc. + Thus, the users of crypto anarchic tools and instruments can have an effect out of proportion to their numbers - others will start to use - resentment by the "suckers" will build - the services themselves--the data havens, the credit registries, the espionage markets--will of course have a real effect 16.29.8. Strong crypto does not mean the end to law enforcement - "...cryptography is not by any means a magic shield for criminals. It eliminates, perhaps, one avenue by which crimes might be discovered. However, it is most certainly not the case that someone who places an open anonymous contract for a murder in an open forum is doing so "risk free". There are *plenty* of ways she might be found out. Likewise, big secret societies that nefariously undermine the free world via cryptography are as vulnerable as ever to the motivations of their own members to expose the groups in a double-cross." [Mike McNally, 1994-09-09]
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