8.13.1. Digital espionage + spy networks can be run safely, untraceably, undetectably - anonymous contacts, pseudonyms - digital dead drops, all done electronically...no chance of being picked up, revealed as an "illegal" (a spy with no diplomatic cover to save him) and shot + so many degrees of freedom in communications that controlling all of them is essentially impossible - Teledesic/Iridium/etc. satellites will increase this capability further + unless crypto is blocked--and relatively quickly and ruthlessly--the situation described here is unstoppable - what some call "espionage" others would just call free communication - (Some important lessons for keeping corporate or business secrets...basically, you can't.) 8.13.2. Remailers needs some "fuzziness," probably + for example, if a remailer has a strict policy of accumulating N messages, then reordering and remailing them, an attacker can send N - 1 messages in and know which of the N messages leaving is the message they want to follow; some uncertainly helps here - the mathematics of how this small amount of uncertainty, or scatter, could help is something that needs a detailed analysis - it may be that leaving some uncertainty, as with the keylength issue, can help 8.13.3. Trying to confuse the eavesdroppers, by adding keywords they will probably pick up on + the "remailer@csua.berkeley.edu" remailer now adds actual paragraphs, such as this recent example: - "I fixed the SKS. It came with a scope and a Russian night scope. It's killer. My friend knows about a really good gunsmith who has a machineshop and knows how to convert stuff to automatic." - How effective this ploy is is debatable 8.13.4. Restrictions on anonymous systems - Anonymous AIDS testing. Kits for self-testing have been under FDA review for 5 years, but counseling advocates have delayed release on the grounds that some people will react badly and perhaps kill themselves upon getting a positive test result...they want the existing system to prevail. (I mention this to show that anonymous systems are somtimes opposed for ideological reasons.)
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