8.13.1. Digital espionage
+ spy networks can be run safely, untraceably, undetectably
- anonymous contacts, pseudonyms
- digital dead drops, all done electronically...no chance
of being picked up, revealed as an "illegal" (a spy with
no diplomatic cover to save him) and shot
+ so many degrees of freedom in communications that
controlling all of them is essentially impossible
- Teledesic/Iridium/etc. satellites will increase this
capability further
+ unless crypto is blocked--and relatively quickly and
ruthlessly--the situation described here is unstoppable
- what some call "espionage" others would just call free
communication
- (Some important lessons for keeping corporate or business
secrets...basically, you can't.)
8.13.2. Remailers needs some "fuzziness," probably
+ for example, if a remailer has a strict policy of
accumulating N messages, then reordering and remailing
them, an attacker can send N - 1 messages in and know which
of the N messages leaving is the message they want to
follow; some uncertainly helps here
- the mathematics of how this small amount of uncertainty,
or scatter, could help is something that needs a detailed
analysis
- it may be that leaving some uncertainty, as with the
keylength issue, can help
8.13.3. Trying to confuse the eavesdroppers, by adding keywords they
will probably pick up on
+ the "remailer@csua.berkeley.edu" remailer now adds actual
paragraphs, such as this recent example:
- "I fixed the SKS. It came with a scope and a Russian
night scope. It's killer. My friend knows about a
really good gunsmith who has a machineshop and knows how
to convert stuff to automatic."
- How effective this ploy is is debatable
8.13.4. Restrictions on anonymous systems
- Anonymous AIDS testing. Kits for self-testing have been
under FDA review for 5 years, but counseling advocates have
delayed release on the grounds that some people will react
badly and perhaps kill themselves upon getting a positive
test result...they want the existing system to prevail. (I
mention this to show that anonymous systems are somtimes
opposed for ideological reasons.)
Next Page: 9. Policy: Clipper,Key Escrow, and Digital Telephony
Previous Page: 8.12 Future Remailers
By Tim May, see README
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